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ABSTRACT. Since 1993, when Hudelmaier developed an O(n log n)-space decision procedure for
propositional Intuitionistic Logic, a lot of work has been done to improve the efficiency of the
related proof-search algorithms. In this paper a tableau calculus using the signs T, F and Fc
with a new set of rules to treat signed formulas of the kind T((A→ B)→ C) is provided. The
main feature of the calculus is the reduction of both the non-determinism in proof-search and
the width of proofs with respect to Hudelmaier’s one. These improvements have a significant
influence on the performances of the implementation.
KEYWORDS: Intuitionistic Propositional Logic, tableau calculi, decision procedures.
DOI:10.3166/JANCL.19.149–166 c© 2009 Lavoisier, Paris
1. Introduction
In this paper we present a tableau calculus for propositional Intuitionistic Logic
Int. The main feature of the calculus is a new set of rules to treat signed formulas
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics. Volume 19 – No. 2/2009, pages 149 to 166
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of the kind T((A → B) → C). This calculus collocates itself in a long history
of researches on the design of efficient decision procedures for Int. In this con-
text, the main concern is the treatment of “positive” implicative formulas, namely
implicative formulas having sign T in a tableau deduction or occurring in the left-
side of a sequent (Dyckhoff, 1992; Hudelmaier, 1989; Hudelmaier, 1993; Miglioli
et al., 1997; Vorob’ev, 1970). Differently from Classical Logic, Intuitionistic impli-
cation is the main source of inefficiency in proof search for the known calculi and
this circumstance makes the decision procedures for propositional Intuitionistic Logic
PSPACE-complete (Statman, 1979; Waaler et al., 1999).
Gentzen’s early calculi (Gentzen, 1969) for Int were based on the re-use of im-
plicative formulas. The major drawback of this solution is that deductions may have
infinite depth, hence some loop-checking mechanism is needed to guarantee termina-
tion. To this aim, Vorob’ev (Vorob’ev, 1970) introduced (in the context of sequent
calculi) rules to treat signed formulas of the kind T(A → B) according to the main
connective of A. See also (Dyckhoff, 1992; Miglioli et al., 1997), where calculi with
analogous properties are given. In these cases, the re-use of formulas is avoided by re-
placing T(A→ B) with “simpler” formulas built up from the subformulas ofA→ B;
moreover, suitable measures on formulas are defined, which guarantee that derivations
have bounded depth. But, although on the one hand decision procedures for these
calculi do not need loop-checking mechanisms, on the other hand the rules to treat
formulas of the kind T((A∨B) → C) and T((A→ B) → C) still give rise to proofs
that may be of exponential depth in the size of the formula to be proved. This problem
is overcome in Hudelmaier’s sequent calculi (Hudelmaier, 1993), where proofs have
linear depth and the related decision procedures require O(n logn)-space. Here we
refer to the Hudelmaier’s sequent calculus LG, whose novelties essentially regard the
treatment of formulas of the kind T(A→ B). To save space, in some rules of LG the
repetition of formulas is avoided by introducing new propositional variables. More-
over, LG provides rules to handle sets of formulas containing both T(A → B) and
FA, giving a rule for every possible form of the main connective of A. We remark
that in (Hudelmaier, 1993) the O(n logn)-space result is proved for the calculus LE,
which improvesLG by providing a compact notation to represent the pairs of formulas
FA,T(A→ B).
The calculus TInt we introduce in this paper is a refinement of Hudelmaier’s cal-
culus LG (Hudelmaier, 1993). Here, we improve LG by giving rules to treat formulas
of the kind T((A→ B) → C), for all the main connectives ofB, without introducing
rules treating pairs of signed formulas. As discussed in the paper, even although TInt
has the same computational performances of Hudelmaier’s calculi, it allows us to de-
fine a “better” decision procedure due to the following facts: (i) in general TInt proofs
have width which is less than that of the corresponding LG proofs; (ii) TInt rules re-
duce the search space. Thus, both the search space and the dimension of the proofs
of TInt are narrower than LG. The new rules of TInt give rise to a calculus whose
proofs have depth bounded by 3n, where n is the size of the formula to be proved;
from such a calculus an O(n log n)-space decision procedure is designed. We have
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A tableau calculus for Propositional Intuitionistic Logic 151
implemented a decision procedure based on TInt, called PITP-3F, based on the PITP
theorem prover of (Avellone et al., 2008). Even if the computational complexity of
our decision procedure only slightly improves the one of (Avellone et al., 2004; Fior-
ino, 2001), the experimental results show that the new rules highly improve the per-
formances of the implementation. In particular, in the paper we compare the PITP-3F
with PITP (Avellone et al., 2008) and STRIP (Galmiche et al., 1999).
We point out that our reasoning is based on semantic tools, whereas (Hudelmaier,
1993) uses syntactic techniques; to prove the equivalence between LG and Gentzen
calculus, the author has to introduce some auxiliary calculi and prove their equiva-
lence. As a by-product, our decision procedure allows us to build a counter-model for
A wheneverA is not intuitionistically valid.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we introduce notations and
the preliminary definitions. In Section 3 we describe TInt and we discuss the main
differences with respect to Hudelmaier’s calculus LG. In Sections 4 and 5 we prove
that TInt is sound and complete and we discuss the computational complexity of the
related decision procedure. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the performances of the
PITP-3F implementation of TInt.
2. Notation and preliminaries
We consider the propositional language L based on a denumerable set of proposi-
tional variables (atoms) PV, the logical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, the parenthesis ’(’
and ’)’. We write A ∈ L to mean that A is a formula of L. To avoid unessential
parenthesis, we assume that ¬ binds stronger than ∧ and ∨; moreover, ∧ and ∨ bind
stronger than →.
Kripke models are the main tool to semantically characterize propositional Intu-
itionistic Logic Int, see e.g. (Chagrov et al., 1997; Fitting, 1969) for the details. A
Kripke model for L is a structure K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉, where 〈P,≤, ρ〉 is a finite poset
with minimum element ρ and  is the forcing relation, namely a binary relation on
P × PV satisfying the monotonicity condition: α  p and α ≤ β implies β  p. The
forcing relation is extended to arbitrary formulas of L as follows:
1) α  A ∧B iff α  A and α  B;
2) α  A ∨B iff α  A or α  B;
3) α  A→ B iff, for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β  A implies β  B;
4) α  ¬A iff, for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β  A does not hold.
We write α 1 A to mean that α  A does not hold. It is easy to check that the
monotonicity property holds for arbitrary formulas, i.e., for every formulaA ∈ L, α 
A andα ≤ β implies β  A. A formulaA is valid in a Kripke modelK = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉
iff ρ  A (by monotonicity property, this means that α  A for every α ∈ P ). It is
well-known (Chagrov et al., 1997; Fitting, 1969) that propositional Intuitionistic Logic
Int coincides with the set of formulas valid in all Kripke models.
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3. The tableau calculus
The tableau calculus TInt we present in this section, is a refinement of the one
introduced in (Fiorino, 2001; Miglioli et al., 1997). It works on signed formulas,
namely expressions of the kind TA, FA or FcA, whereA ∈ L. Signed formulas have
a natural interpretation in Kripke semantics. Given a Kripke model K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉,
an elementα ∈ P and a signed formulaH , α realizesH inK, and we writeK,α⊲H ,
iff:
- H = TA and α  A;
- H = FA and α 1 A;
- H = FcA and α  ¬A.
K,α ⋫ H means that K,α ⊲ H does not hold. Given a set S of signed formulas,
K,α ⊲ S iff K,α ⊲H for every H ∈ S; we say that S is realizable if K,α ⊲ S for
some K and α. We call the certain part of S the set
Sc = {TA | TA ∈ S} ∪ {FcA | FcA ∈ S}
We remark that, by the monotonicity property,K,α⊲S and α ≤ β imply K,β⊲Sc.
Table 1. The TInt calculus
S,T(A ∧B)
S,TA,TB
T∧
S,F(A ∧B)
S,FA | S,FB
F∧
S,Fc(A ∧B)
Sc,FcA | Sc,FcB
Fc∧
S,T(A ∨B)
S,TA | S,TB
T∨
S,F(A ∨B)
S,FA,FB
F∨
S,Fc(A ∨B)
S,FcA,FcB
Fc∨
Tables 2 and 3
S,F(A→ B)
Sc,TA,FB
F→
S,Fc(A→ B)
Sc,TA,FcB
Fc→
S,T(¬A)
S,FcA
T¬
S,F(¬A)
Sc,TA
F¬
S,Fc(¬A)
Sc,TA
Fc¬
where Sc = {TA | TA ∈ S} ∪ {FcA | FcA ∈ S}
The rules of the tableau calculus TInt are shown in Tables 1–3. In the rules we
write S,H as a shorthand for S ∪{H}. Every rule applies to a set of signed formulas,
but only acts on the signed formula H explicitly indicated in the premise; we call H
the major premise of the rule, whereas we call all the other signed formulas minor
premises of the rule.
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Table 2. Rules for T →
S,TA,T(A→ B)
S,TA,TB
MP
S,T(A→ B)
S,FcA | S,TB
T→certain if S = Sc
S,T((A ∧B) → C)
S,T(A→ (B → C))
T→∧
S,T(¬A→ B)
Sc,TA | S,TB
T→¬
S,T((A ∨B) → C)
S,T(A→ q),T(B → q),T(q → C)
T→∨ with q a new atom
The sets in the consequence are obtained by decomposing in some way the major
premise of the rule and either copying all the minor premises (see, e.g., the rule T∧ of
Table 1) or only copying the certain part of the minor premises (see, e.g., the rule F →
of Table 1). When the conclusion of a ruleR contains two sets, we separate them with
the splitting symbol | and we call R a splitting rule.
Some rules require additional conditions in order to be applied. The rule T →
certain of Table 2 can be applied only if S = Sc, namely the set S of minor premises
does not contain F-signed formulas. The rule MP (modus ponens) of Table 2, hav-
ing T(A → B) as major premise, requires the presence of TA among the minor
premises. We point out that in (Hudelmaier, 1993) this rule is restricted to the case
where A is a propositional variable. Finally, we notice that some rules of Tables 2
and 3 require the introduction of a new atom q, namely a propositional variable q not
occurring in the premises of the rule. This expedient goes back to (Hudelmaier, 1993)
and avoids repetitions of subformulas of the major premise in the conclusion of a
rule. For instance, without the introduction of q, the consequence of T → ∨ should
be S,T(A → C),T(B → C), where C occurs twice, and this double occurrence
prevents the definition of a linear complexity measure on sets of signed formulas.
A set S of signed formulas is contradictory if {TA,FA} ⊆ S or {TA,FcA} ⊆ S,
for some formula A. Clearly, contradictory sets are not realizable. A proof table (or
proof tree) for S is a finite tree τ with S as root and such that all the children of a
node S′ of τ are the sets in the consequence of a rule applied to S′. If all the leaves
of τ are contradictory sets, we say that τ is a closed proof table for S and we say that
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S is provable in TInt. A set of signed formulas S is consistent iff S is not provable
in TInt. As stated in Theorem 10 of Section 5, TInt is a complete calculus for Int,
namely: for every finite set of signed formulas S, S is consistent if and only if S is
realizable. In particular, let us say that a formula A is provable in TInt iff {FA} is
provable. Since A ∈ Int if and only if the set {FA} is not realizable, as a corollary
of the completeness of TInt we get:
COROLLARY 1 (). — A is provable in TInt iff A ∈ Int.
Table 3. Rules for T →→
S,T((A→ p) → C)
Sc,TA,Fp,T(p→ C) | S,TC
T→→Atom where p ∈ PV
S,T((A→ ¬B) → C)
Sc,TA,TB | S,TC
T→→¬
S,T((A→ (X ∧ Y )) → C)
Sc,TA,Fq,T(X → (Y → q)),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→∧ with q a new atom
S,T((A→ (X ∨ Y )) → C)
Sc,TA,Fq,T(X → q),T(Y → q),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→∨ with q a new atom
S,T((A→ (X → Y )) → C)
Sc,TA,TX,Fq,T(Y → q),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→→ with q a new atom
Given a set S, in general we can apply to S more than one rule, according to the
choice of the major premise H ∈ S. Suppose that, after having applied the rule R, no
closed proof table for S is found. If R is an invertible rule, we can conclude that S
is consistent, otherwise we have to backtrack and choose in S another major premise.
Invertible rules of TInt can be semantically characterized as follows 1. Let R be a rule
with premise S and consequence S1| . . . |Sn; R is invertible iff, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Sk realizable implies S realizable. Suppose that, after having applied R to S, the
proof search for S fails. This means that there is a set Sk in the consequence of R
such that Sk is consistent. By the completeness of TInt, Sk is realizable hence, R
being invertible, S is realizable as well. By the completeness of TInt, we conclude
that S is consistent, thus there is no way to build a closed proof table for S.
1. The discussion holds for any complete calculus for Int.
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One can easily check that the rules T∧, F∧, T∨, F∨, Fc∨, T¬ of Table 1 and
the rules MP , T → certain, T → ∧, T → ∨ of Table 2 are invertible. All the other
rules are not invertible, since the set S in the premise is reduced to Sc. For instance,
let us consider the rule Fc∧ of Table 1. If Sc,FcA is realizable, then Sc,Fc(A ∧ B)
is realizable, but we cannot conclude anything about the realizability of the signed
formulas in S \ Sc.
To conclude this section we discuss the main novelties of our calculus; in particular
we consider the differences among TInt and the tableau calculi of (Fiorino, 2001;
Miglioli et al., 1997) and the sequent calculi introduced in (Hudelmaier, 1993). For
sequent calculi we present the rules adopting the standard translation into tableau rules.
First of all we notice that the rules of Tables 1 and 2 essentially coincide with those
described in (Miglioli et al., 1997), where the sign Fc is introduced to characterize
Intuitionistic negation. The rules of Table 3 replace the rule
S,T((A→ B) → C)
Sc,TA,FB,T(B → C) | S,TC
T→→
of (Miglioli et al., 1997), that goes back to (Dyckhoff, 1992) and (Vorob’ev, 1970)
(given in a sequent calculus style), and Fiorino’s rule Fio→→ (Fiorino, 2001) shown
at the end of this section. The aim of the rule T →→ is to avoid loop-checking
in the decision procedure. On the other hand, the double occurrence of the for-
mula B in the leftmost conclusion of T →→ gives rise to deductions that may be
of exponential depth in the length of the formula to be proved, see (Galmiche et
al., 1999; Hudelmaier, 1993) for a detailed discussion. In (Hudelmaier, 1993) the
problem is solved by introducing, beside the rule T →→, some rules to treat the
leftmost conclusion of T →→, according to the main connective of B. Moreover,
the calculus LG (Hudelmaier, 1993) provides rules to handle the pairs of formulas
FB,T(B → C), according to the main connective of B. The tableau rules corre-
sponding to the rules of LG for B = X ∨ Y are:
S,F(X ∨ Y ),T(X ∨ Y → C)
S,T(Y → q),T(q → C),FX,T(X → q)
Hud→∨1
S,F(X ∨ Y ),T(X ∨ Y → C)
S,T(X → q),T(q → C),FY,T(Y → q)
Hud→∨2
where q is a propositional variable not occurring in the premises. We remark that both
the rules are required to get completeness. Indeed, to build a proof for S,T((A →
X ∨ Y ) → C) (working on the signed formula T((A → X ∨ Y ) → C)), in LG we
firstly have to apply the rule T →→:
S,T((A→ X ∨ Y ) → C)
Sc,TA,F(X ∨ Y ),T(X ∨ Y → C) | S,TC
T→→
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At this point we have to non-deterministically choose which rule to apply between
Hud→ ∨1 and Hud→ ∨2. In the former case we get
Sc,TA,T(Y → q),T(q → C),FX,T(X → q) | S,TC
in the latter
Sc,TA,T(X → q),T(q → C),FY,T(Y → q) | S,TC
Obviously, to build up a closed proof table it may be necessary to try both rules. In
contrast, in TInt only the application of the rule T →→ ∨ is required:
S,T((A→ X ∨ Y ) → C)
Sc,TA,Fq,T(X → q),T(Y → q),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→∨
Hence our rule decreases the non-determinism in proof-search.
Now, let us consider the rule of LG for the case B = X ∧ Y
S,F(X ∧ Y ),T(X ∧ Y → C)
S,FX,T(X → (Y → C)) | S,FY,T(Y → (X → C))
Hud→∧
and let us consider the tableau
S,T((A→ X ∧ Y ) → C)
Sc,TA,F(X ∧ Y ),T(X ∧ Y → C) | S,TC
T→→
Sc,TA,FX,T(X → (Y → C)) | Sc,TA,FY,T(Y → (X → C)) | S,TC
Hud→∧
In our calculus, for the same initial premise we get:
S,T((A→ X ∧ Y ) → C)
Sc,TA,Fq,T(X → (Y → q)),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→∧
where q is a new propositional variable. Our rule decreases the width of the proof
tree. Indeed, to decide the realizability of the initial set, with our calculus TInt two
sets have to be decided, instead of three sets as in LG.
Finally, let us consider the LG rule for the case B = X → Y
S,F(X → Y ),T((X → Y ) → C)
Sc,TX,FY,T(Y → C)
Hud→→
and let us consider the tableau
S,T((A→ (X → Y )) → C)
Sc,TA,F(X → Y ),T((X → Y ) → C) | S,TC
T→→
Sc,TA,TX,FY,T(Y → C) | S,TC
Hud→→
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In our calculus the corresponding tableau is
S,T((A→ (X → Y )) → C)
Sc,TA,TX,Fq,T(Y → q),T(q → C) | S,TC
T→→→
with q a new propositional variable. Hence, while we apply one non-invertible rule,
in the previous proof tree two non-invertible rules are required. A deeper discussion
about the proof-search strategy is given after the proof of the Completeness Theorem
in Section 5.
We emphasize that the rules of Table 3 are a refinement of the rule
S,T((A→ B) → C)
Sc,TA,Fq,T(B → q),T(q → C) | S,TC
Fio→→ with q a new atom
introduced in (Fiorino, 2001). The calculus (Fiorino, 2001) gives rise to proof trees
having depth bounded by 6n, where n is the length of the formula to be proved, and
this yields an O(n log n)-space decision procedure for Int. Rules of Table 3 are ob-
tained by specializing rule Fio →→ according to the main connective of B. As we
discuss in Section 5, the new rules allow us to get proof trees having depth 3n at most
(see Theorem 11).
4. Soundness
In order to prove the soundness of TInt, we prove that its rules preserve realizabil-
ity, namely: if the set in the premise of a rule R is realizable, then one of the sets in
the consequence of R is realizable as well.
The following lemma is helpful to treat the rules of Table 3.
LEMMA 2. — Let K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉 be a Kripke model and let α ∈ P such that
K,α⊲ S,T((A→ B) → C) and K,α ⋫ TC
Let V be the set of propositional variables occurring in S∪{T((A→ B) → C)} and
let q be a propositional variable such that q 6∈ V . Then, there exists a Kripke model
K′ = 〈P ′, ≤′, ρ′, ′〉 and α′ ∈ P ′ such that
K′, α′ ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,T(B → q),T(q → B),T(q → C)
PROOF 3. — LetK′ = 〈P,≤, ρ,′〉 be the Kripke model based on the poset 〈P, ρ,≤
〉 with ′ defined as follows:
- if p ∈ V then, for every γ ∈ P , γ ′ p iff γ  p;
- for every γ ∈ P , γ ′ q iff γ  B;
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- if p 6∈ V ∪ {q} then, for every γ ∈ P , γ 1′ p.
It is easy to check that ′ satisfies the monotonicity condition. Moreover, if H is
a formula whose propositional variables belong to V and γ ∈ P , then γ  H iff
γ ′ H . In particular, by the assumptions α  (A → B) → C and α 1 C, we get
α ′ (A → B) → C and α 1′ C. This implies α 1′ A → B, therefore there exists
β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β ′ A and β 1′ B. We get:
1) β ′ B → q and β ′ q → B (by definition of ′ on q);
2) β 1′ q (by (1) and by the fact that β 1′ B);
3) β ′ q → C (indeed, α ′ (A→ B) → C, α ≤ β and β ′ q → B).
Summarizing, we conclude
K ′, β ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,T(B → q),T(q → B),T(q → C)
which proves the assertion. 
Now we prove that the rules of TInt preserve the realizability.
LEMMA 4. — Let S be a set of signed formulas, let K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉 be a Kripke
model and let α ∈ P such that K,α ⊲ S, and let R be a rule of TInt applicable
to S. Then, there exist a set S′ in the consequence of the rule R, a Kripke model
K′ = 〈P ′,≤′, ρ′,′〉 and α′ ∈ P ′ such that K′, α′ ⊲ S′.
PROOF 5. — By case distinction on R. We only discuss the most relevant cases of
Tables 2 and 3.
Rule T → certain: let us assume K,α ⊲ Sc,T(A → B). By finiteness of P , there
is φ ∈ P such that α ≤ φ and φ is a maximal element of K (that is, for every ψ ∈ P ,
φ ≤ ψ implies φ = ψ). By the monotonicity property, K,φ ⊲ Sc,T(A → B). If
φ  B, we immediately getK,φ⊲Sc,TB; otherwise φ 1 A and, being φ a maximal
element, this implies φ  ¬A, hence K,φ⊲ Sc,FcA.
Rule T →→ Atom: if K,α ⊲ S,T((A → p) → C), then α  (A → p) →
C, thus α  C or α 1 A → p. In the first case, we immediately deduce that
K,α ⊲ S,TC. In the second case, there exists β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β  A
and β 1 p. Moreover, since β  (A → p) → C, we also have β  p → C. We
conclude that K,β ⊲ Sc,TA,Fp,T(p→ C).
Rule T →→ ∨: if K,α⊲S,T((A→ (X ∨Y )) → C), then α  (A→ (X ∨Y )) →
C. If α  C, we immediately get K,α⊲ S,TC. Otherwise, by Lemma 2 there exist
a Kripke model K ′ = 〈P ′,≤′, ρ′,′〉, α′ ∈ P ′ and q such that
K′, α′ ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,T((X ∨ Y ) → q),T(q → (X ∨ Y )),T(q → C) .
Since α′ ′ (X ∨ Y ) → q implies both α′ ′ X → q and α′ ′ Y → q, we get
K′, α′ ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,T(X → q),T(Y → q),T(q → C).
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Rule T →→→: if K,α ⊲ S,T((A → (X → Y )) → C), then α  (A → (X →
Y )) → C. If α  C, we immediately get K,α ⊲ S,TC. Otherwise, by Lemma 2
there exist a Kripke model K ′ = 〈P ′,≤′, ρ′,′〉, α′ ∈ P ′ and q such that
K ′, α′ ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,T((X → Y ) → q),T(q → (X → Y )),T(q → C) .
Since α′ ′ (X → Y ) → q and α′ 1′ q, there exists β′ ∈ P ′ such that α′ ≤′ β′,
β′ ′ X and β′ 1′ Y . Since β′ ′ q → (X → Y ), we have β′ 1′ q. Moreover, since
β′ ′ (X → Y ) → q, it holds that β′ ′ Y → q. Summarizing, we get
K′, β′ ⊲ Sc,TA,Fq,TX,T(Y → q),T(q → C)
and this concludes the proof.
The other cases are similar. In particular, in theses cases the consequence of a rule
is realized in the same model K (or even at the same element α). 
As a consequence we get:
THEOREM 6 (SOUNDNESS). — Let S be a set of signed formulas. If S is realizable,
then S is consistent.
PROOF 7. — Suppose that S is not consistent and let τ be a closed proof table for S.
If, by absurd, S is realizable, by the previous lemma there must be a leaf Sf of τ such
that Sf is realizable, a contradiction (recall that Sf is a contradictory set). Thus, S is
not realizable, and this concludes the proof. 
5. Completeness
To prove the completeness of TInt we introduce the complexity measure deg on
formulas:
- if p is a propositional variable, then deg(p) = 0;
- deg(A ∧B) = deg(A) + deg(B) + 2;
- deg(A ∨B) = deg(A) + deg(B) + 3;
- deg(A→ B) = deg(A) + deg(B) + 1;
- deg(¬A) = deg(A) + 1.
We extend the function deg to signed formulas as follows:
- For a signed formula SA (S ∈ {T,F,Fc}), deg(SA) = deg(A).
- For a finite set S of signed formulas, deg(S) =
∑
H∈S deg(H).
The definition of deg is motivated by the fact that, if S′ is a set in the consequence of
a rule of TInt applied to a finite set of signed formulas S, then deg(S′) < deg(S).
To describe our proof search strategy, we introduce the notion of rule related to S
and H , where S is a set of signed formulas and H a signed formula.
- If H has not the form T(A → B), the rule related to S and H is the only rule
of Table 1 having H as major premise and S \ {H} as set of minor premises.
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- If H = T(A→ B) and TA ∈ S, the rule related to S and H is the rule MP of
Table 2 having H as major premise and S \ {H} as set of minor premises.
- If H = T(A → B), TA 6∈ S and S = Sc, the rule related to S and H is the
rule T → certain of Table 2 havingH as major premise and S \ {H} as set of minor
premises.
- If H = T(A → B), TA 6∈ S and S 6= Sc, the rule related to S and H is one
of the rules of Table 2 and 3 having H as major premise and S \ {H} as set of minor
premises (there exists only one applicable rule).
Notice that given S and H there exists at most one rule R of TInt related to S and
H . If R is a splitting rule, we denote with R1S,H and R2S,H the leftmost set and the
rightmost set in the consequence of R respectively; for non-splitting rules we denote
with R1S,H the only set in the consequence of R (R2S,H is not defined). The main
lemma to prove the completeness of TInt is:
LEMMA 8. — Let S be a finite set of signed formulas. If S is consistent, then S is
realizable.
PROOF 9. — By complete induction on deg(S). Assume that the assertion holds for
all S′ such that deg(S′) < deg(S); we prove it for S. Let S0 ⊆ S be the set of signed
formulas H of S satisfying one of the following conditions:
(i) H = T(A ∧ B) or H = F(A ∧ B) or H = T(A ∨ B) or H = F(A ∨ B) or
H = Fc(A∨B) orH = T(¬A) orH = T((A∧B) → C) orH = T((A∨B) → C).
(ii) H = T(A→ B) and (TA ∈ S or S = Sc).
(iii) H = T(¬A → C) or H = T((A → p) → C) or H = T((A → ¬B) → C)
or H = T((A → (X ∧ Y )) → C) or H = T((A → (X ∨ Y )) → C) or H =
T((A→ (X → Y )) → C), and R2S,H is consistent.
Firstly, let us assume that S0 6= ∅ and let H be any formula of S0. Since S is
consistent, there exists k ∈ {1, 2} such that the set S′ = RkS,H is consistent; in
particular, if H is one of the signed formulas in case (iii), we take S′ = R2S,H , where
we recall that R2S,H = (S \ {H}) ∪ {TC}. Since S′ is consistent and deg(S′) <
deg(S), by induction hypothesis there exists a Kripke model K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉 such
that K, ρ⊲ S′. It is easy to check that K, ρ⊲ S, and this proves the assertion.
Secondly, let us assume that S0 = ∅. Let S1 ⊆ S be the set of formulas H ∈ S
satisfying one of the following conditions:
1) H = Tp or H = Fcp or H = Fp, with p a propositional variable.
2) H = T(p→ B), with p a propositional variable and Tp 6∈ S.
Let S2 ⊆ S be the set of formulas H ∈ S satisfying one of the following conditions:
3) H = Fc(A ∧B) or H = F(A→ B) or H = Fc(A→ B) or H = F(¬A) or
H = Fc(¬A).
4) H = T(¬A→ C) or H = T((A→ Z) → C), and R1S,H is consistent.
Since S is consistent and S0 is empty, we have S1 ∪ S2 = S. If S2 = ∅, then
S = S1 can be realized in the Kripke model K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉 where P = {ρ} and,
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for every propositional variable p, ρ  p iff Tp ∈ S (note that K can be seen as
a classical model). Otherwise S2 6= ∅. Let us assume S2 = {H1, . . . , Hn}. By the
choice of S2, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is k ∈ {1, 2} such that the set Tj = RkS,Hj
is consistent (ifHj 6= Fc(A∧B), we take k = 1). Since deg(Tj) < deg(S) and Tj is
consistent, by induction hypothesis there exists a Kripke modelKj = 〈Pj ,≤j, ρj ,j〉
such thatKj , ρj⊲Tj . Without loss of generality, we assume that the Pj ’s are pairwise
disjoint. We build the Kripke model K = 〈P,≤, ρ,〉 where ρ is a new element
(ρ 6∈ ⋃
1≤j≤n Pj) and the immediate successors of ρ are the elements ρ1, . . . , ρn;
formally:
P =
⋃
1≤j≤n
Pj ∪ {ρ} ≤ =
⋃
1≤j≤n
≤j ∪ {(ρ, α) | α ∈ P}
Finally, for every α ∈ P and every propositional variable p, α  p iff one of the
following conditions holds:
- there is j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that α ∈ Pj and α j p;
- α = ρ and Tp ∈ S.
One can easily prove that′ satisfies the monotonicity condition. Moreover, for every
α ∈ Pj and every formula H , α  H iff α j H ; in particular, K, ρj ⊲ Tj for every
1 ≤ j ≤ n.
We prove that K, ρ ⊲ H for every H ∈ S (recall that S = S1 ∪ S2). The proof
bases on a case distinction on the conditions (1)–(4).
If H = Tp, by definition ρ  p. If H = Fp then, by consistency of S, Tp 6∈ S,
hence ρ 1 p. If H = Fcp, then Fcp ∈ Tj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n (indeed, Fcp ∈ Sc and
Sc ⊆ Tj). It follows that ρj  ¬p for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Moreover, by consistency of
S, Tp 6∈ S. We conclude ρ  ¬p.
Let H = T(p → B) and let α ∈ P such that α  p. Since Tp 6∈ S (by
Condition (2) in the definition of S1), we have ρ 1 p, hence α 6= ρ. Let i be such that
α ∈ Pi. Since ρi  p→ B and ρi ≤ α, it follows that α  B.
Let H = F(A→ B). There exists an m such that Tm = (Sc \ {H})∪{TA,FB}
and K, ρm ⊲ Tm. It follows that ρm  A and ρm 1 B, hence ρ 1 A→ B.
Let H = T((A→ (X ∧ Y )) → C). There exists m such that
Tm = (Sc \ {H} ) ∪ {TA, Fp, T(X → (Y → p)), T(p→ C) }
and K, ρm ⊲ Tm. Let α ∈ P such that α  A → (X ∧ Y ). Since ρ ≤ ρm, ρm  A
and ρm 1 X ∧ Y (otherwise, ρm  p would follow), α 6= ρ. Let j be such that
α ∈ Pj . If j = m, we have ρm ≤ α, which implies α  C. Let j 6= m. In this
case, H ∈ Tj . By the fact that K, ρj ⊲ Tj , H ∈ Tj and ρj ≤ α, we get α  C. The
remaining cases are similar. 
By the previous lemma and the Soundness Theorem (Theorem 6), we conclude
that TInt is a complete calculus for Int:
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THEOREM 10 (COMPLETENESS). — Let S be a finite set of signed formulas. Then,
S is consistent if and only if S is realizable.
The proof of Lemma 8 implicitly defines a decision procedure for Intuitionistic
Logic; indeed, starting from a finite set S of signed formulas, either a closed proof
table or a counter-model for S can be built. In the following, we sketch the strategy
we apply in the decision procedure.
In our decision procedure, cases (i)–(ii) in the definition of S0 correspond to the
application of invertible rules. As usual, applying invertible rules before non-invertible
ones reduces the search-space. Accordingly, if there exists H ∈ S satisfying one of
cases (i)–(ii), we firstly apply the rule related to S and H ; if the search for a closed
proof table fails, we conclude that S is not provable (as discussed in Section 3, there
is no need to backtrack and try the application of another rule to S). Otherwise, let
us assume that no formula H ∈ S satisfies cases (i)–(ii) and that there exists an H =
T(A → B) in S. Under that assumption, we try to build first a proof table for the
“invertible consequence” R2S,H = (S \ {H}) ∪ {TC}; if such a proof does not exist,
we get a counter-model for S and hence S is not provable. On the other hand, if we
find a proof for R2S,H but R1S,H is not provable, one of the cases (3) and (4) in the
definition of S2 holds: neither a proof table nor any counter model can be constructed.
We have to try the application of another rule to S because the counter model for S
relies on the counter model of R1S,Hj , for all Hj ∈ S, as a whole. In all the other
cases, either non-invertible rules are applicable to S or no rules at all.
Finally, we remark that a proof table for a set S not containing F-signed formulas
is a classical derivation. Indeed, in the proof we can always apply one of the rules of
Table 1 or the rules MP and T → certain of Table 2, which are classical rules and
do not generate F-signed formulas.
We conclude this section discussing the complexity of our calculus. Given a for-
mula A, |A| denotes the number symbols occurring in A; similarly, if S is a set of
signed formulas, |S| is the number of symbols occurring in S.
THEOREM 11 (). — Let S be a finite set of signed formulas. Then, the depth of every
proof table for S is at most 3|S|.
PROOF 12. — Let us consider the complexity measure deg defined at the beginning
of Section 5. By induction hypothesis on the structure of a formula A, one can prove
that deg(A) ≤ 3|A|. This implies that deg(S) ≤ 3|S|. By inspecting the rules of
the calculus and how they are used to build proof tables, it follows that the complexity
w.r.t. deg of every set of signed formulas in a proof tree is higher than all its immediate
successors, and this proves the proposition. 
An inspection of the rules of TInt yields that the increase of symbols in any con-
sequence compared to its premise is bounded by a constant. As a consequence, see
(Hudelmaier, 1993), a depth-first decision procedure for S requires at mostO(n log n)
bits to store the required data structures.
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6. Experimental results
We devote this section to discuss the improvements obtained by implementing
rules of Table 3. We have implemented the new rules by modifying PITP (Avellone
et al., 2008). No further modification has been done. We call PITP-3F the new ver-
sion of the theorem prover2. We remark that PITP implements the tableau calculus of
(Avellone et al., 2004; Fiorino, 2001) and it is at present the fastest available theo-
rem prover for propositional Intuitionistic Logic on the formulas of the ILTP library,
see (Avellone et al., 2008) for a detailed comparison with other provers.
Experiments have been carried out along the lines of (Raths et al., 2007) and the
results are summarized in Tables 4–63. In particular, Table 4 and Table 5 refer to
simulations over randomly generated formulas with a time bound of 10 minutes, the
former considering formulas with 2000 connectives and 100 variables, the latter re-
ferring to formulas with 5000 connectives and 100 variables. Table 6 summarizes the
results obtained with the same formulas considered in Table 5 with the time bound
extended to 50 minutes. In every entry we indicate the number of formulas decided
in the specified time range and between brackets we put the total time required to de-
cide them; “k(n.a.)” in the last column means that k formulas have not been decided
within the indicated time bound. The last row indicates the gain in number of formulas
of PITP-3F over PITP.
Table 4. Randomly generated formulas with 2000 connectives and 100 variables, time
limit 10 minutes
0-1s 1-10s 10-100s 100-600s >600s
PITP 1905(20s) 20(71s) 14(508s) 11(2576s) 48(n.a.)
PITP-3F 1910(21s) 19(67s) 13(368s) 12(2901s) 44(n.a.)
Total improvement +5 +4 +3 +4
A deeper analysis of the execution times on randomly generated formulas with 2000
connectives and 100 variables shows that PITP requires 3175 seconds to solve the
1950 formulas decided in 10 minutes. To decide these 1950 formulas, PITP-3F takes
1913 seconds: this gives an improvement of about 40%. If we consider also the four
formulas decided by PITP-3F and not decided by PITP in 10 minutes, we have that
PITP-3F requires 3357 seconds, whereas PITP requires 6876 seconds with an advan-
tage of about 51%. We run also STRIP on the same formulas. During the experiments
we observed that on the first 782 formulas, STRIP took more than 10 minutes on 341
of them.
As for Table 5, if we consider the formulas decided by both provers in 10 minutes
we get that PITP-3F requires 3093 seconds whereas PITP requires 4651 seconds, with
2. Available at http://www.dimequant.unimib.it/~guidofiorino/pitp.jsp
3. Experiments have been carried out on a 3.00GHz Intel Xeon CPU computer with 2MB cache
size and 2GB RAM.
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Table 5. Randomly generated formulas with 5000 connectives and 100 variables, time
limit 10 minutes
0-1s 1-10s 10-100s 100-600s >600s
PITP 1810(43s) 41(142s) 22(844s) 14(3622s) 113(n.a.)
PITP-3F 1810(42s) 44(140s) 22(678s) 23(5904s) 101(n.a.)
Total improvement 0 +3 +3 +12
a time reduction of about 34%. If we also consider the twelve formulas decided by
PITP-3F and not decided by PITP in 10 minutes, we have that PITP-3F requires 6765
seconds, whereas PITP requires 45320 seconds and the improvement is about 85%.
If we extend the time bound to 50 minutes (Table 6) we see that PITP-3F requires
16950 seconds whereas PITP requires 30156 seconds, with an advantage of about 44%.
Finally, if we also consider the seven formulas decided by PITP-3F and not decided by
PITP in 50 minutes we have 24893 seconds vs. 128349 seconds with an improvement
of about 80%.
Table 6. Randomly generated formulas with 5000 connectives and 100 variables, time
limit 50 minutes
0-1s 1-10s 10-100s 100-3000s >3000s
PITP 1810(43s) 41(142s) 22(844s) 32(29127s) 95(n.a.)
PITP-3F 1810(42s) 44(140s) 22(678s) 36(24032s) 88(n.a.)
Total improvement 0 +3 +3 +7
As another experiment we run both provers on 2000 randomly generated formulas
containing 750 connectives and 50 variables without time limit. PITP-3F solved all the
formulas in 77848 seconds whereas PITP took 166573 seconds.
To conclude this discussion, we remark that we have not reported experiments over
the formulas in ILTP Library (Raths et al., 2007). On these formulas PITP-3F weakly
improves PITP, but this essentially depends on implementation features; indeed, on the
formulas of ILTP Library the significant features of our calculus are not exploited since
they contains only “trivial” cases of nested implications and only the T →→ Atom
rule is required.
In Table 7 we report the results related to some formulas of ILTP library modi-
fied by substituting every propositional variable pi occurring in them with the formula
(ri → si) → ti. By this substitution we obtain formulas with nested implications.
The execution times show that PITP-3F is faster than PITP; in particular, on the fam-
ily formulas obtained from SYJ207+1 and SYJ211+1 the running time of PITP grows
faster than PITP-3F. This is a further clue that the rules introduced in this paper im-
prove the performances. For the sake of completeness we also run STRIP. The results
show that STRIP outperforms PITP-3F on two families of formulas. We remark that
the growing ratio on the family SYJ203 is approximately four for both provers. On
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the other families PITP-3F is faster than STRIP. We also remark that on such a families
PITP-3F has a lower growing ratio than STRIP.
Table 7. PITP and PITP-3F compared on formulas of ILTP library modified by substi-
tuting pi with (ri → si) → ti (times in seconds)
Formula
SYJ
PITP PITP-3F STRIP
201.3 0.12 0.11 0
201.4 1.46 1.17 0.004
201.5 15.92 12.21 0.008
201.6 165.78 126.23 0.02
203.8 0.290 0.210 0.056
203.9 1.06 0.8 0.2
203.10 4.12 3.02 0.85
203.11 15.95 11.71 3.10
207+1.2 0.02 0.001 > 600
207+1.3 0.78 0.170 > 600
207+1.4 151.83 8.5 > 600
Formula
SYJ
PITP PITP-3F STRIP
209+1.6 0.18 0.13 9.56
209+1.7 1.48 1.02 254
209+1.8 13.99 9.28 > 600
209+1.9 141.95 92.99 > 600
211+1.6 0.66 0.04 43
211+1.7 2.7 0.05 > 600
211+1.8 11.24 0.12 > 600
211+1.9 46.22 0.28 > 600
7. Conclusions
This paper describes the tableau calculus for propositional Intuitionistic Logic
TInt. On the one hand TInt has the same computational properties of the calculus
LG presented in paper (Hudelmaier, 1993), on the other hand TInt has some features
thatLG lacks and deserves to be considered. In particular, both the proof search-space
and the size of the proof-tree of TInt are narrower than LG and this can reduce the
running time. TInt is also an improvement of the calculus of (Avellone et al., 2004)
on which PITP is based. At present PITP is the fastest prover among those of ILTP li-
brary. Our comparisons between PITP and PITP-3F, that is the implementation of PITP
in which the new rules are inserted, confirm that in the practice TInt gives advantages.
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